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NOTE
IMPERSONAL PERSONHOOD: CRAFTING A COHERENT
THEORY OF THE CORPORATE ENTITY
Bryan P. Mageet
Corporate legal personhood is a baffling and elusive
concept. Are corporations persons and, if so, what does
this mean?Ascribing the moniker of "person" to a corporation
can conjure up the idea that a corporate entity is entitled to all
the natural and legal rights that natural "personhood" entails.
This, how-ever, ignores that there are different kinds of
"legal person" and that the scope of their respective rights
differs based on the purpose of the personhood they are given.
This Note posits that the law grants corporations entity-hood
primarily to cen-tralize contractual rights and obligations.
This purpose, this Note contends, is the root of the "nexus of
contracts" theory-a theory which suggests that corporations
are not persons, but webs of contracts between their
stakeholders. However, as David Gindis has noted, the
nexus does not replace the corpo-rate entity-it is the
corporate entity. Further, nexus of con-tracts can and
should be repurposed as a theory of corporate entity-hood, as
it offers a theoretical framework for defining and limiting
the scope of this ambiguous concept. Corpora-tions should
only be granted the rights necessary to fulfill this particular
kind of personhood's contractarian purpose-and this fits
within the Bill of Rights' individual-rights framework. Such
an understanding meshes Gindis's interpretation with
David Ciepley's proposal for a separate category of "corporate
person" in a way that preserves Ronald Coase's purposing of
the firm in defining corporate rights. This Note looks at the
right to freedom of speech as an example of the nexus for
contracts theory's application and concludes that this right is
not strictly necessary to fulfill the contractarian purpose of
corporate entity-hood. This new theory can and should be
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INTRODUCTION
On a sweltering summer afternoon in 2011 at the Iowa
State Fair in Des Moines, as patrons indulged in such delica-
cies as pork ribs, corn on the cob, funnel cakes, and lemonade,
former Massachusetts governor and then-presidential candi-
date Mitt Romney made his now-infamous characterization of
the ill-understood legal status of corporations: "Corporations
are people, my friend."' Romney was referring to who ulti-
mately benefits from corporate activities: the natural persons
I Philip Rucker, Mitt Romney Says 'Corporations are People,' WASH. POST
(Aug. 11, 2011), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/mitt-romney-says-
corporations -are-people/20 11/08/11 /gIQABwZ38I story.html [https://
perma.cc/U6JF-3PRE]. Romney was responding to a member of the audience
who suggested raising taxes on corporations as an alternative to raising taxes on
"real" people. Id. Romney is technically right, though for the wrong reason (the
profits a corporation makes belong to the corporation, not the people "behind" it),
and this mischaracterization of corporate personhood highlights the need for a
coherent theory of corporate entity-hood. See infra Part II.
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behind them.2 Clearly, though, Romney's characterization
touched a nerve. Some in attendance, unsurprisingly, were
rather dissatisfied with the comment: "No, they're not!"3 The
personification of corporations receives much ridicule, some-
times with little thought given to its utility, because the un-
qualified suggestion that corporations are "persons" leads to
wild inferences, not the least of which is that society should
grant corporations all the rights of living humans. 4 The Su-
preme Court has notably treated corporations as persons
(while also bizarrely ignoring this status when convenient, as
discussed in subpart II.B., infra) 5but the real problem is that,
while corporations are apparently "persons" in some sense, it is
not immediately clear what that means. What rights do corpo-
rations get? This Note suggests that a coherent answer is hid-
den within a theory that is widely understood to cut against
corporate personhood entirely: nexus of contracts.
Nexus of contracts has particular theoretical appeal be-
cause it captures a central tenet of corporate purpose: people
form corporations as a means of consolidating contractual
rights and obligations-and to minimize the costs of doing bus-
iness, whatever that business might be.6 The nexus theory,
while really a theory of the firm, still has application as a theory
of the corporation; the contractarian purpose can form the ba-
sis of a tenable theory of corporate personhood and the rights
that come with it.
Critics have attacked the nexus theory on the grounds that
it is not consistent with legal personhood because it does not
acknowledge the corporation as a separate entity, and the
boundaries of the nexus are not clear. 7 However, the nexus
2 Id.
3 Id. Romney's comment was met with equal vitriol on the internet. See,
e.g., Jedke Mekt, Comment to Romney: Corporations Are People Too, YOIJTUBE
(Aug. 12, 2011), https: //www.youtube.com/watch?v=FXUsRedO4UY&lc=ugx
Jikyv5EMPnCnliBV4AaABAg [https://perma.cc/23MT-P9LT] ("If corporations
are people, when will Romney be pushing for [investment banking corporation]
Goldman Sachs to go to prison?"). But see Jonathan Chait, Romney is Right:
Corporations are People, NEW REPUBLIC (Aug. 11, 2011), https://newrepublic.com/
article/93518/romney-right-corporations-are-people [https://perma.cc/JD9J-
NVRZ], for a defense of the comment and an explanation of what Romney may
have been referring to.
4 See, e.g., Why Corporations Are Not People, MOVE TO AMEND, https://move
toamend.org/why-corporations-are-not-people-0 [https://perma.cc/76WL-
AMR5] (making a general argument against a blanket grant of personhood to
corporations, without discussing whether specific aspects of personhood are nec-
essary for corporations to function).
5 See infra section I.B. 1.
6 See infra section I.C.2.
7 See infra subpart I.B.
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theory can be reconciled with corporate legal personhood-a
reconciliation David Gindis at the University of Hertfordshire
has already suggested.8 This Note goes a step further by sug-
gesting that this reconciliation has important ramifications for
the purpose and scope of corporate personhood. To that end,
this Note's thesis is that corporate personhood is a means to an
end-centralizing contractual obligation-and, most impor-
tantly, the scope of a corporation's rights should be defined and
limited accordingly. This examination of purpose and scope
builds on David Ciepley's suggestion for a distinct and sepa-
rately developed breed of corporate person. 9 This Note takes
one infamous example of the debate over corporate rights-
freedom of speech-and applies the nexus for contracts theory.
A revised understanding of the nexus of contracts theory
that is consistent with corporate legal personhood is a step
toward demystifying the concept of corporate personhood and,
most importantly, creating a framework that defines and limits
this elusive concept. Noting that corporations are people must
come with some qualification (which Ciepley has indicated), '0
and this qualification must be backed by a coherent theoretical
framework. By applying this retooled theory in the context of
corporate rights, this Note aims squarely at that goal.
I
BACKGROUND: NEXUS OF CONTRACTS AND LEGAL
PERSONHOOD
A. Brief History of the Contractarian Corporation
In this subpart, I provide the history, background, and an
explanation of the nexus of contracts theory. Such back-
ground, as well as the theoretical hurdles the nexus theory
faces, is crucial to understanding the theory as a framework for
corporate entity-hood. The theory itself finds its origins in
Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling's 1976 article, The-
ory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Owner-
ship Structure, in which they suggested the nexus framework
8 See David Gindis, The Nexus Paradox: Legal Personality and the Theory of
the Firm (May 1, 2013) (published Ph.D. thesis, University of Hertfordshire), at
170-85, http://uhra.herts.ac.uk/bitstream/handle/2299/11351 / 12005578
%20Gindis%2ODavid % 2 0final%2OPhD%20submission.pdf~sequence= 1 [https://
perma.cc/WK6H-8JM3] (reconciling the nexus theory with corporate entity-hood).
9 See David Ciepley, Beyond Public and Private: Toward a Political Theory of
the Corporation, 107 AM. POL. SCI. REv. 139, 152 (2013) ("[Corporations] are
neither public nor private, but should be placed in a separate theoretical, legal,
and policy category-the category of the corporate.").
10 See id. at 154-55.
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as a means of understanding the corporation as a vehicle for
minimizing agency costs via contract. "1 Even before this, how-
ever, many of the nexus theory's proponents consider Ronald
Coase to have been the progenitor of the contractarian theory
of the corporation. 12
1. From Ronald Coase to Jensen and Meckling
The nexus theory posits that the corporation is not a sepa-
rate entity but rather a web (or a nexus) of contracts between
the corporation's stakeholders. 13 Jensen and Meckling, in
their 1976 article, argue that the corporation, because it is not
an individual, does not itself have a purpose and cannot have
duties and responsibilities independent of its stakeholders. 14
They liken the corporation to a market, arguing that it is not
common-and would be odd-to refer to the market as an indi-
vidual in describing its behavior, and that to describe the cor-
poration as an individual is a mischaracterization. 15
For a number of years, many prominent legal scholars con-
sidered nexus of contracts to be the predominant theory of the
corporation. 16 This, I suggest, is because of its inherent ap-
peal: it captures the essence of corporate purpose as a vehicle
for contracts (this is why corporate legal personhood is a prac-
tical necessity, contrary to Jensen and Meckling's thesis).1 7
However, as previously stated, the nexus theory is opposed to
the idea that the corporation is a separate entity; iswhy is this
so? The nexus theory clings to what its proponents view as a
Coasean ideal, where fiduciary duties and other "default rules"
are subject to the establishment and modification of contract. 19
1 1 See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firnm Manage-
rial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308-11
(1976) (suggesting that the corporation is a nexus of contracts and that the utility
of the corporation is as a vehicle to minimize agency costs).
12 See Charles R.T. O'Kelley, Coase, Knight, and the Nexus-of-Contracts The-
ory of the Firm: A Reflection on Reification, Reality, and the Corporation as Entre-
preneur Surrogate, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 1247, 1247 (2012). See generally R.H.
Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 390-98 (1937) (outlining reasons
people form firms).
13 Jensen & Meckling, supra note 11, at 311.
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 O'Kelley, supra note 12, at 1247 ("This account, which has dominated legal
scholarship for four decades, describes a corporation as a nexus of
contracts .... ").
17 See infra section I.C.2.
i8 Jensen & Meckling, supra note 11, at 311.
19 Jonathan R. Macey, Fiduciary Duties as Residual Claims: Obligations to
Nonshareholder Constituencies from a Theory of the Firm Perspective, 84 CORNELL
L. REV. 1266, 1268 (1999).
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One can trace the line of scholarship that advocates for a
contractarian understanding of the corporation to Ronald
Coase's seminal paper The Nature of the Firm, published in
1937.20 In that paper, Coase sought to answer the question of
why and under what circumstances individuals choose to form
firms (not just corporations involving multiple individuals, but
also partnerships and other business organizations) instead of
contracting through the market on their own to achieve their
goals; indeed, Coase begins the paper by lamenting that law
and economics scholars appropriate the concept of the "firm"
without a clear definition of the term. 21 Coase ultimately con-
cludes that, although one would expect that it would always be
more efficient to do business via individual contract instead of
forming a firm,22 there must be some cost of this individualistic
approach that creates the incentive to organize a firm. 2 3 Signif-
icantly, Coase hints at the importance of the separate corpo-
rate entity in eliminating these "contract costs." 2 4 He writes
that "[it is true that contracts are not eliminated when there is
a firm but they are greatly reduced."25 Instead of forming indi-
vidual contracts with others, to use their specialized and nec-
essary know-how, parties form one agreement with and
through the firm that grants authority to the entrepreneur (or
agent of the corporation) to "direct the other factors of produc-
tion."26 Coase, long before Jensen and Meckling, touched on
contract as a key aspect of the purpose and function of the firm
(and, specifically, the corporation involving multiple individu-
als). A reading of Jensen and Meckling suggests that they
missed the underlying importance that Coase places on the
20 O'Kelley, supra note 12, at 1247-48, 1247 n.3. O'Kelley claims that Jensen
and Meckling's nexus of contracts theory is really a misappropriation and misun-
derstanding of Coase's thesis; nevertheless, O'Kelley concedes, the Jensen and
Meckling theory is part of a line of scholarship that can be traced back to Coase.
See id.
21 See Coase, supra note 12, at 390 ("Our task is to attempt to discover why a
firm emerges at all in a specialised exchange economy."); see also id. at 386 ("For
instance, it is suggested that the use of the word 'firm' in economics may be
different from the use of the term by the 'plain man.' Since there is apparently a
trend in economic theory towards starting analysis with the individual firm and
not with the industry, it is all the more necessary not only that a clear definition of
the word 'firm' should be given but that its difference from a firm in the 'real
world,' if it exists, should be made clear." (footnotes omitted)).
22 See id. at 390 (considering and dismissing reasons why individuals do not
solely use the "price mechanism" in their economic affairs).
23 Id. ("The main reason why it is profitable to establish a firm would seem to
be that there is a cost of using the price mechanism.").
24 See id. at 391.
25 Id. (emphasis added).
26 Id.
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firm as a separate entity-contracts formed through and with a
separate entity vastly reduce the number of agreements that
would otherwise have to be formed between Coase's "factors of
production '2 7 and each of the individual stakeholders.
2. The Firm v. the Corporation: A Crucial Distinction
An important disjuncture to note in the development of the
contractarian theory of the corporation (as opposed to a con-
ception of the firm) is the obfuscation of the corporation and
the firm. Coase's theory is one of the firm, 28 and Jensen and
Meckling present theirs as a theory of the firm as well. 2 9 How-
ever, the two concepts-the corporation and the firm-are not
the same. As Lynn Stout notes, a firm, broadly defined, is an
organized business enterprise between multiple persons. 30 A
corporation is a creature of law structured according to certain
legal specifications; not all corporations are firms (i.e., closely
held corporations with single shareholders) and not all firms
are corporations (i.e., partnerships, etc.). 3 1 As Stout goes on to
note, "[a] theory of the firm is not a theory of the corporation. '" 32
While Jensen and Meckling (and Coase before them) might be
on to something regarding corporate purpose, they describe
economic theories of the firm, not legal theories of the
corporation.33
Such obfuscation-between concepts of the firm and the
corporation-could have precipitated the nexus of contracts
theory's divergence from the legal personality of the corpora-
tion. 34 The conception of the corporation as (and always as) a
firm lends itself nicely to a focus on agency costs in the corpo-
rate form 35 -and this is precisely what Jensen and Meckling
set out to address. 36 In turn, the misguided notion that a
corporation's shareholders are principals and its directors and
27 Id.
28 See Coase, supra note 12, at 386.
29 See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 11, at 305 (outlining a theory of the
ownership structure of the firm).
30 Lynn Stout, The Economic Nature of the Corporation, in 2 THE OXFORD HAND-
BOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS: PRIVATE AND COMMERCIAL LAW 337, 337-38 (Francesco
Parisi ed., 2017) [hereinafter Stout, Economic Nature].
31 Id.
32 Id. at 338.
33 See Coase, supra note 12, at 386. See generally Jensen & Meckling, supra
note 11 (integrating elements of agency, property rights, and finance to develop a
theory of the ownership structure of the firm).
34 See Stout, Economic Nature, supra note 30, at 338.
35 Id.
36 See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 11, at 357 (suggesting that the utility of
the corporation is as a vehicle to minimize agency costs).
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officers are agents of the shareholders fits well within the
agency cost paradigm of corporate theorization. 37 One can
touch on some overarching purpose for business entities in
describing a theory of the firm, but such a theory's descriptive
qualities as applied to specific legal forms are dubious at best.
The difficulties this divergence presents for the nexus theory,
as well as the criticisms of the theory that stem from them, are
outlined in subpart I.B, infra.
B. Contractarianism v. the Corporate Entity
The nexus of contracts theory faces theoretical hurdles. I
discuss two that are particularly relevant to this Note's thesis:
legal personhood and boundaries of the nexus. These two are
interconnected (the second stems from the first) and are
predominantly why the relevance of the nexus of contracts the-
ory is threatened in many circles. These issues provide the
background for the nexus theory's paths forward and those
alternatives' implications in formulating a coherent theory of
corporate legal personhood.
1. Legal Personhood
Perhaps the most significant theoretical hurdle that the
nexus of contracts theory faces is the reality that the corpora-
tion is a state-sanctioned entity that enjoys rights appurtenant
to its status as a legal "person": signing contracts (through a
human agent), owning property, and suing in its own name,
among others.3 8 Jensen and Meckling's theory, in its unal-
tered form, refuses to acknowledge this reality; it contends that
the corporation is not an entity at all, and it is most certainly
not a person in the legal meaning of the term (which is the
former's logical corollary).3 9 With the U.S. Supreme Court's
decision in Citizens United v. FEC,40 as well as Burwell v.
Hobby Lobby,4 1 these hurdles have become all the more signifi-
cant; Supreme Court jurisprudence seems to be moving in the
direction of treating corporations as persons in the legal sense
(even if not being explicit or logically consistent in this regard),
37 See Stout, Economic Nature, supra note 30, at 338.
38 Grant M. Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie, The Uncorporation and the Unrav-
eling of "Nexus of Contracts" Theory, 109 MICH. L. REv. 1127, 1127 (2011) ("A
corporation is not a contract. It is a state-created entity. It has legal personhood
with the right to form contracts, suffer liability for torts, and.., make campaign
contributions.").
39 Jensen & Meckling, supra note 11, at 311.
40 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
41 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
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not away from it as the traditional nexus theory's proponents
would have. 42
Legal personhood is a status sanctioned and granted by
the state. 43 A major criticism of the nexus of contracts theory
is that it neglects to acknowledge the role of the state in char-
tering the corporation. 44 While the corporation may function-
ally appear to be a "nexus" of contracts, it cannot be created
through contract alone.45 Most importantly, at least as far as
the state is concerned, the corporation does actually exist as an
entity separate from its stakeholders and the contracts be-
tween those stakeholders. 46 If, in the world Jensen and
Meckling describe, the corporation was not a separate entity,
state-sanctioned default rules would not exist (or, at least,
would exist in a very different form) .4 7 One example is the
fiduciary duties that directors owe the corporation; in the
nexus of contracts world as posed by Jensen and Meckling,
such fiduciary duties would not exist outside of what the stake-
holders contracted for (and would not be owed to a "corpora-
tion" in any case, since the corporation is not a person, and
indeed is not anything other than that ever-elusive, intangible
nexus).4 8 Instead, if such duties existed, they would be con-
tractual in nature and presumably owed to stockholders di-
rectly (or whichever other party contracted for them).49 This
notion has contributed to the pervasiveness of the shareholder
value (or supremacy) theory, which lends itself nicely to the
nexus of contracts framework.5 0 As corporate theorists have
42 The ruling in Citizens United, in particular, builds on previous case law,
presuming the corporation's status as a speaker for First Amendment purposes
as an individual apart from its stakeholders. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 365.
43 Legal personhood, after all, is a designation conferred by the law entitling
its holder to certain rights, such as holding property and standing to sue. See
Alexis Dyschkant, Note, Legal Personhood: How We Are Getting It Wrong, 2015 U.
ILL. L. REv. 2075, 2076 (2015).
44 Hayden & Bodie, supra note 38, at 1127 (noting that the corporation is a
state-created entity, in direct conflict with the nexus of contracts theory).
45 Id.
46 Id. (noting that the corporation is an entity).
47 Macey, supra note 19, at 1268 (noting that adherents to the nexus of
contracts theory argue that fiduciary duties must be contracted for in the corpo-
rate context and that they are subject to contractual modification, even if they are
"default" rules).
48 See id.
49 Id.
50 This refers to the idea that shareholders are the owners and residual claim-
ants of the corporation; absent a separate corporate entity (as posited by the
nexus theory), this becomes easier to imagine. See LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER
VALUE MYTH 2-3 (2012) [hereinafter STOUT, VALUE MYTH]; see also William W. Brat-
ton, Jr., The "Nexus of Contracts" Corporation: A Critical Appraisal, 74 CORNELL L.
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moved away from the shareholder value theory (or "myth," to
borrow terminology from Lynn Stout), the nexus theory's rele-
vance has diminished. 5 1
2. Boundaries of the Nexus
This second challenge is a corollary of the first: if the corpo-
ration is not a separate entity with clearly delineated bounda-
ries, but is rather a web of interconnected contracts among its
various stakeholders, then how far does this web extend? 52
The nexus of contracts theory provides no clear answer, 53 and
any possible answer depends on the way the question is asked.
One way to illustrate the theoretical challenge this issue
presents is via hypothetical. If Person A buys a shiny new
Great American Car from the local Great American Car dealer-
ship, A has formed a contract with the dealership, which in
turn has a contract with Great American Car Company (a cor-
poration).54 This suggests a question: Given A's connection via
contract to Great American Car Company, is A now part of the
nexus that is the corporation? What if A sells her Great Ameri-
can Car to Person B? Is B now part of the nexus? Who is and is
not part of the nexus of contracts that is "Great American Car
Company"? Another way to consider these questions is to
think about who is potentially going to be held liable when
Person C sues Great American Car Company. The answer to
this last question, of course, is that none of these parties (ex-
cept Great American Car Company itself, whatever that might
mean) generally will be. 55 As a practical matter, the corpora-
tion exists as a separate legal entity regardless of what Jensen
and Meckling's theory might suggest; at least, the law treats it
as such. 56 Without this reality, as the hypothetical demon-
strates, the corporation's boundaries are unclear at best and
nonexistent at worst.
REV. 407, 420 (1989) ("The separation of ownership and control... disappears in
the new economic picture.").
51 See id.
52 See Bratton, supra note 50, at 420; Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Conception
that the Corporation Is a Nexus of Contracts, and the Dual Nature of the Firm, 24 J.
CORP. L. 819, 827-30 (1998).
53 See id.
54 This discussion is drawn from a hypothetical suggested by Professor Lynn
Stout. For Stout's own discussion of the car company hypothetical, see Stout,
Economic Nature, supra note 30, at 346-47.
55 Great American Car Company, as a separate legal entity in reality, has
standing to sue and can be sued in its own name. See Hayden & Bodie, supra
note 38, at 1127.
56 See id.
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C. Nexus at a Crossroads
There are two primary paths forward for the nexus of con-
tracts theory. These two alternatives are (1) maintaining the
divide and using the nexus idea to argue against the treatment
of the corporation as a separate entity and (2) reconciling the
theory with reality to acknowledge the corporation's separate
entity status. This Note advocates for the second alternative.
1. Division: The Contractarian Ideal?
One potential response for the nexus of contracts theory's
proponents is to simply stay the course and maintain that the
corporation, despite its treatment by courts and the state, is
nothing more than a nexus of contracts. After all, one of the
motivating factors of Jensen and Meckling's original thesis was
the corporate responsibility movement of the 1970s; Jensen
and Meckling were providing the theoretical framework for an
ideological argument against corporate regulation. 57 Visualiz-
ing the corporation as a legal entity separate from its stake-
holders arguably gave proponents of enhanced corporate
regulation the framework they needed to ascribe obligations
and liabilities to these entities themselves. 58 Within Jensen
and Meckling's framework, it makes little sense to regulate the
corporation as an entity because, of course, there exists noth-
ing other than the contracts between the relevant stakehold-
ers. 59 Thus, government regulation of the monolithic corporate
entity is little more than state infringement on these private
agreements and their respective parties.60
However, it is not clear that the contractarian theory of the
corporation even supports less regulation of corporations. 6 1
Instead, Professor Joseph F. Morrissey argues that if striving
for a contractarian ideal in which the sanctity of private con-
tract is to be protected, policy-makers should understand and
accept the post-Lochner notion that ex ante regulation is cru-
cial to structuring a system of corporate law and governance
57 See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 11, at 311 ("Viewing the firm as the
nexus of a set of contracting relationships among individuals also serves to make
it clear that the personalization of the firm implied by asking questions such as
... 'does the firm have a social responsibility' is seriously misleading.").
58 See id.
59 See id.
60 See id. (arguing that such treatment and regulation of the corporation
wrongfully characterizes it as a separate individual).
61 See Joseph F. Morrissey, A Contractarian Defense of Corporate Regulation,
11 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. Bus. L. 135, 136 (2009).
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where this is So. 6 2 Later in this Note, I discuss why state-
sanctioned legal personhood and the regulation that comes
with it still further support the contractarian ideal. 6 3
Another aspect of this approach is the idea that sharehold-
ers are the center of the corporation and are thus its owners
and controlling stakeholders. 64 Without the corporate entity at
the center, it is easy to visualize shareholders as being at the
center of the nexus of contracts. 65 Part of the nexus of con-
tracts theory's staying power, I and others suggest, has been its
complementariness with the shareholder value or shareholder
primacy theory, which suggests that the primary function and
purpose of a business corporation is to maximize the return on
investment of its shareholders. 66 However, as Lynn Stout sug-
gests, this relies on a simple amalgamation of shareholder in-
terests and encourages short-sighted profit maximization,
potentially at the expense of long-term investment and
growth. 67
This approach presents the unusual political dilemma of
using what is essentially a classically liberal theory of the cor-
poration 68 to argue against legal personhood for corporations
and any rights appurtenant to that status. The nexus theory
could be used as a tool to argue against considering corpora-
tions as legal persons, and therefore against granting them
rights as such.69 However, a dilemma arises because those
who are ideologically disposed to arguing against corporations
holding constitutional rights 7° are likely not of the ideological
62 Id.
63 See infra section I.C.1.
64 See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 11, at 333 (referring to the sharehold-
ers as "absentee owner[s]" of the corporation).
65 See Bratton, supra note 50, at 420.
66 Absent the reality that the corporation is a separate entity, it is easier to
envision shareholders as the "owners" of the corporation, its assets, and its prof-
its. See STOUT, VALUE MYTH, supra note 50, at 15-16.
67 Id. at 16.
68 Again, it is worth noting that some commentators see the contractarian
theory of the corporation as cutting against corporate regulation generally. See
Morrissey, supra note 61, at 136.
69 This is the natural corollary of Jensen and Meckling's argument that ask-
ing questions about corporate responsibility incorrectly reifies the corporate en-
tity; thinking about the rights of such an entity would similarly reify it by
acknowledging that it is, in fact, a separate entity. See Jensen & Meckling, supra
note 11, at 311.
70 Arguments against corporate rights have a decidedly liberal tilt, contrasted
with the anti-corporate regulation stance of many conservatives. See, e.g., Chris
Good, Citizens United Decision: Republicans Like It, Liberals Don't, ATLANTIC (Jan.
21, 2010), https: //www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2010/01/citizens-
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conviction to argue for a contractarian theory of the firm. 7 1 For
this reason, a more suitable and logically consistent theory is
probably available to opponents of corporate personhood; de-
lineating such a theory is outside the scope of this Note.
Customers
Creditors Other
SShareholders
Suppliers Directors
Employees
FIGURE 1:
Visualization of the corporation as a nexus of contracts in
lieu of an entity. Note that shareholders are conceptually
easy to place in the middle as the residual claimants
in this model, absent a property-owning entity.
2. Reconciliation: The Gindis Solution
In 2013, David Gindis proposed a reconciliation of legal per-
sonhood and the nexus of contracts theory at the University of
Hertfordshire in England, United Kingdom. 72 The crux of
Gindis's argument is that the corporation as a separate entity
is not an entire fiction but rather the separate entity that is the
corporation itself serves as the nexus of contracts. 73 In es-
sence, the corporate entity is a means of consolidating contrac-
tual rights and obligations into a single "person" separate from
the corporation's stakeholders-and this "person" forms the
hub of a wheel of contracts, which extend out as spokes from
united-decision-republicans-like-it -liberals-dont/33935/ [https://perma.cc/
9H2U-SNFJ] (outlining the basic arguments for and against corporate rights).
71 See supra note 68.
72 See generally Gindis, supra note 8 (reconciling the nexus theory with per-
sonhood's general value to the corporate form).
73 Id. at 10.
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the center. 74 The Gindis solution is intellectually satisfying on
multiple levels and I briefly outline in this section why this is
so-and how it provides a framework through which to under-
stand the theoretical purpose of corporations and the per-
sonhood status conferred on them, the latter of which I flesh
out in Part II, infra.
Reconciling the nexus of contracts theory with legal per-
sonhood is intellectually satisfying because it injects new life
into a theory that sounds right for good reason. Jensen and
Meckling, although they may have been attempting to formu-
late a descriptive theory that describes the reality of corpora-
tions, capture the essence of corporate purpose-much like
Coase did four decades before. 75 While Jensen and Meckling
miss the mark in describing corporations as a practical mat-
ter, 76 inherent in their theory is the idea that people charter
corporations to consolidate contractual rights and obligations
in a manner that maximizes efficiency.
Crucial to the Coasean goal of corporations is the idea that
this form of business organization aims to reduce transaction
and agency costs as much as possible.77 Indeed, it seems a
logical argument can be made that the corporation as a sepa-
rate entity (which serves as the nexus of contracts) itself
achieves the Coasean goal of minimizing transaction costs,
without having to pretend it does not exist.7 8 Instead of negoti-
ating and executing countless duplicative contracts among all
stakeholders of the corporation, the corporation as legal entity
serves as a separate contracting party to contracts which, pre-
sumably, each independent stakeholder would otherwise be
individually party to. 79 This consolidation has the benefit of
74 Id.
75 Both Coase and, together, Jensen and Meckling see the corporation very
generally as a means of minimizing the costs of doing business; in some way, the
corporation is a more efficient way to do business. See Coase, supra note 12, at
391; Jensen & Meckling, supra note 11, at 311 ("It is a legal fiction which serves
as a focus for a complex process in which the conflicting objectives of individuals
... are brought into equilibrium within a framework of contractual relations.").
76 See supra subpart I.B.
77 See supra note 75.
78 CORPORATE PERSONALITY IN THE 20TH CENTURY 18 (Charles E.F. Rickett & Ross
B. Grantham eds., 1998).
79 Id. Additionally, altering the parties to such contracts would require nova-
tion; if all shareholders (for example) were party to a contract, to remove or add a
shareholder from that contract or, if each shareholder was party to a separate
contract, would require novation or negotiation of a new contract to remove or add
shareholders, respectively. See Novation, WEX LEGAL DICTIONARY, https://
www.law.comell.edu/wex/novation [https://perma.cc/A3PZ-APRX] (describing
the concept of novation to replace one party to a contract with another).
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minimizing contract negotiation and enforcement costs-hav-
ing one contracting entity in the center vastly simplifies doing
business.
Going back even further to focus on this contractarian pur-
pose of the corporation, one can look to Ancient Roman law in
thinking about why the very idea of business organizations
came about. While large, publicly-traded stock corporations
with which modern students of corporate law are very much
familiar were likely absent from the Ancient Roman economy,
there is a plethora of evidence supporting the existence of
smaller "capital associations"-the societas, the societas publi-
canorum, and the peculium.80 These smaller associations
tended to stay small-most examples of societas consisted of
only two partners. 8 1 The small size of these associations in
Ancient Rome suggests that these three ancient associations
were more properly understood as a nexus of contracts-es-
sentially a contract between two or a few partners to pool their
resources. Perhaps this was really the root of the nexus of
contracts theory, and this understanding of the general firm's
purpose stuck around until well after the development of much
larger modem corporations and their more-developed aspects
of entity-hood. Gindis' reconciliation of the two ideas retains
the importance of the pooling rationale for forming a capital
association and suggests an understanding of corporate per-
sonhood that furthers this goal.8 2
In effect, the nexus of contracts theory is about purpose,
while other, seemingly inconsistent theories, are about the na-
ture of the corporation. While Jensen and Meckling focus very
broadly on the concept of thefirm in their discussion of agency
costs, 8 3 suggested frameworks such as the entity theory (which
describes the corporation as a legally distinct entity) and the
franchise government theory (which suggests that state gov-
ernments delegate limited government-like powers to corporate
entities) attempt to describe the legal form of corporations.84
The nexus of contracts theory's ancestral lineage from Coase's
8o See, e.g., Scott Hirst, Corporate Law Lessons from Ancient Rome, HARV. L.
SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (June 19, 2011), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/
2011/06/19/corporate-law-lessons-from-ancient-rome/ [https://perma.cc/
5383-B4EZ] (presenting evidence of smaller business entities in Ancient Rome).
81 Id.
82 See Gindis, supra note 8, at 175-78.
83 See supra section I.A.2 for a discussion of the distinction between corpora-
tions and firms, the obfuscation of this distinction, and that obfuscation's role in
the theoretical backdrop of the nexus theory.
84 See Stout, Economic Nature, supra note 30, at 343-47 (outlining different
theories of the corporation and suggesting that those that acknowledge the entity-
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work-which itself is about the broad purpose offirmsS8 5 sug -
gests that what Jensen and Meckling are really concerned
about is the purpose of the corporate form, rather than its
nature. More specifically, Jensen and Meckling are concerned
with corporations that involve multiple individuals (that fall
under the umbrella of firms) because of their focus on agency
costs. 8 6 Gindis' reconciliation preserves this aspect of purpose,
while acknowledging the nexus theory's dubiousness as a the-
ory of the corporation (rather than a broad theory of thefirm) by
letting other "rival" theories do the legally descriptive legwork. 87
Gindis is right; legal personhood need not get in the way of
an otherwise compelling economic theory of the firm as applied
to the corporation. Gindis focuses on asset lock-in and entity
shielding as elements of legal personhood that are valuable to
the Coasean idea of minimizing transaction costs through the
corporate form. 88 The even more important takeaway from
Gindis' contribution, though, is that the corporation as a con-
tracting entity furthers what I suggest is the purpose of creat-
ing a corporation, derived from the nexus of contracts theory
(centralizing contractual rights and obligations, from which
other aspects flow and which these other aspects seek to
achieve), and provides perspective as to the purpose and scope
of corporate legal personhood. 89
hood of the corporation are the most well-grounded as descriptive theories of the
corporation).
85 See generally Coase, supra note 12, at 390-405 (outlining Coase's theory of
the firm).
86 See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 11, at 308-10 (discussing agency costs
among individuals in the context of corporations).
87 See Gindis, supra note 8, at 97 (reconciling the nexus theory withcorporate
entity-hood).
88 Id. at 170-99.
89 See infra Part II.
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Shareholders
Directors Employees
Creditors Suppliers
Customers
FIGURE 2:
Gindis's interpretation visualized, showing the corporation
as a separate legal entity that itself serves
as a nexus of contracts
II
A NEXUS FOR CONTRACTS: A NEW THEORY OF CORPORATE
PERSONHOOD (ENTITY-HOOD) AND RIGHTS
In this Part, I apply the Gindis retooling of the nexus of
contracts theory to various issues regarding corporate legal
personhood. I attempt to outline a coherent theory of corporate
personhood, its purpose, and its boundaries. Gindis's sugges-
tion goes a long way towards demystifying the concept of legal
personhood as it pertains to corporations, but Gindis does not
suggest a framework for examining the outer boundaries of
legal personhood for corporations. 90 Pursuant to Gindis's
work, I identify centralizing contractual rights and obligations
(i.e., Coase's ideal of minimizing transaction costs, essentially
the contractarian narrative meshed with the idea of legal per-
sonhood)9 1 as the defining purpose of corporate personhood. I
then suggest that this purpose ought to be the lens through
which policy-makers and courts examine the outer boundaries
of corporate personhood and, accordingly, what rights corpora-
90 See Gindis, supra note 8, at 170-99 (outlining personhood's general value
to the corporate form).
91 See id.; see also Coase, supra note 12, at 391 (discussing how the struc-
ture of the firm reduces contract costs).
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tions should have-particularly in the context of corporate in-
volvement in politics.
Beginning here, I use the term "entity-hood" to describe the
concept of corporate personhood to demystify the concept of
corporate entity-hood; the concept should be separated from
the flesh-and-blood incarnations of this legal status that are
conjured up in the minds of many who happen upon the con-
cept of corporations as persons in any sense, and the charged
ideological instincts that come with them. 92
A. Contract Is Central to the Purpose of Corporate Entity-
hood
A corollary to Gindis's thesis that the corporate entity
serves as the nexus of contracts is that there are different
breeds of legal person, of which the corporation is but one.93
As applied to human beings, the status of legal person is a
means for the law to ascribe certain rights and obligations to
natural persons, thereby granting human beings agency to act
in legally significant ways, many of which make little sense in
the corporate context. 94 Legal personhood (or entity-hood, as I
insist on calling the concept in the case of corporations), is not
a status reserved just for natural persons and organizations.
There are numerous examples of the law conferring per-
sonhood status on animals and even natural resources. 95
Surely, the reasons for conferring such status in each situation
differ and certainly the outer boundaries of that status have
much to do (or should have much to do) with those reasons.
The primary reason for granting entity-hood to corpora-
tions is to achieve the Coasean goal of minimizing transaction
92 Referring to corporations as persons has a politically controversial history
that I do not intend to evoke in this Part. See Rucker, supra note 1 (detailing then-
U.S. presidential candidate Mitt Romney's claim that corporations are people and
the charged reaction thereto).
93 See generally Gindis, supra note 8, at 170-99 (outlining personhood's gen-
eral value to the corporate form).
94 For example, corporations cannot vote or run for office. Editorial, The
Rights of Corporations, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 21, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/
2009/09/22/opinion/22tue 1 .html [https: //perma.cc/KYD9-E322].
95 See, e.g., Katie Sykes, Human Drama, Animal Trials: What the Medieval
Animal Trials Can Teach Us About Justice for Animals, 17 ANIMAL L. 273, 280-88
(2011) (detailing the history of putting animals on trial as persons); Eleanor Ainge
Roy, New Zealand River Granted Same Legal Rights as Human Being, GuARDIAN
(Mar. 16, 2017, 12:50 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/mar/
16/new-zealand-river-granted- same-legal- rights- as -human-being [https://
perma.cc/UJP2-DDCY] (reporting on the legal person status of a river in New
Zealand).
514 [Vol. 104:497
IMPERSONAL PERSONHOOD
costs by centralizing contractual rights and obligations. 96
Most other aspects of corporate entity-hood flow centrally from
this primary purpose. For instance, entity- shielding is a natu-
ral corollary of the corporation-as-vehicle-for-contract idea; to
act as a central vehicle for contract, assets must be partitioned
(or clearly separated) between the entity itself and its stake-
holders. 97 In most circumstances, the entity itself is liable for
the obligations it rightfully incurs and is entitled to its own
rights acquired via contract as well. One example of the cross-
over between asset-partitioning and entity-shielding occurs in
the context of debtor-creditor relations. 98 To continue its func-
tion as a business entity, the corporation often must secure
credit to cover its operating costs. 99 To serve as a distinct
nexus for the contracts that create and regulate these lines of
credit, the corporation as a separate entity must be able to
become a debtor in its own right' 00 -and creditors ought to
have the ability to be informed as to who exactly they are deal-
ing with. 101
Another example of an aspect of corporate entity-hood that
flows naturally from the contractarian purpose, and one that is
closely related to the above discussion of entity-shielding, is
the often-discussed concept of limited liability. For the most
part, corporations are separately liable for their legal obliga-
tions in both contract and tort, subject of course to the possi-
bility of a court deciding to pierce the corporate veil. 102 To
serve as an effective nexus for contracts as a separate legal
entity, limited liability is a necessity for a couple reasons. From
96 See supra section I.C.2.
97 See Henry Hansmann et al., Law and the Rise of the Firm, 119 HARV. L.
REV. 1335, 1337 (2006) ("Special legal rules, which we term rules of asset parti-
tioning, are required to determine which entities bond which contracts.
(footnote omitted)).
98 Id. at 1336.
99 In the ML: Corporate Funding Sources, TREASURY TODAY (Jan. 2015), http://
treasurytoday.com/2015/01/in-the-mix-corporate-funding-sources-ttcf [https:/
/perma.cc/YL7B-4XM3].
100 See Hansmann et al., supra note 97, at 1336.
101 Creditors, in dealing with corporations as entities, ought to be able to
ascertain which assets are available to the entity and which assets belong to the
stakeholders and are thus inaccessible to the creditor. Abuse of this key aspect of
the corporate form is possible and inevitable; to curtail this, certain formalities
must be followed to signal to creditors that they are dealing with a corporate entity
and not the person behind it. Piercing the Corporate Veil, WEX LEGAL DICTIONARY,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/piercing the corporate veil [https://
perma.cc/G33K-YR94]. When these formalities are not followed, a court can
choose to bypass the entity and hold its stakeholder(s) liable; this is referred to as
'piercing the corporate veil." Id.
102 See supra note 101.
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the stakeholders' perspective in particular, centralizing con-
tractual obligations in the corporate entity enables them to
take calculated business risks in a manner that distributes
risk proportionally to the stakes held by the stakeholders. 10 3 If
the corporation fails, the typical shareholder loses only the cost
of his or her share, assuming the corporation has lost all of its
value (probably to its creditors). 10 4 Centralizing obligation in
this way encourages efficient decision-making on the part of
managers 10 5 and easier access to capital markets for the enter-
prise as a whole. 106 Therefore, limited liability both serves the
contractarian purpose and is a necessary component thereof.
Limited liability, viewed through the lens of the con-
tractarian idea of the purpose of corporate entity-hood, is more
difficult to justify in the tort context. Does allowing corporate
stakeholders to evade liability for the torts for which the entity
is held responsible further the goal of centralizing contractual
rights and obligations? One might argue that it does, for the
same reason limited liability is justified in the contract con-
text-it is a means of spreading risk among the stakehold-
ers. '0 7 However, I suggest this is only really justifiable when
the tort in question is the unavoidable result of a lawful con-
tract entered into by the corporation; lOScorporations should be
vehicles for encouraging calculated and rational risk-taking be-
havior, but not without regard to the rights of others. Indeed,
courts seem to be more amenable to piercing the corporate veil
in the tort context because of the lack of bargaining between
the tort victim (an involuntary creditor) and the entity. '0 9 Lim-
ited liability and asset partitioning, key elements of corporate
entity-hood, flow naturally from the nexus-for- contracts pur-
pose that I suggest for the reasons I have just outlined.
The purpose of corporate entity-hood of non-profit corpora-
tions should not be viewed as substantially different from that
of the concept as applied in the context of for-profit business
corporations. One might argue that since the profit motive is
103 See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the
Corporation, 52 U. CHI. L. REv. 89, 90 (1985) ("No one risks more than he
invests.").
104 See id.
105 Id. at 95.
106 See id. at 93-97 (detailing how limited liability shifts risk from sharehold-
ers to creditors, making investment appealing).
107 See id. (discussing risk-shifting as a result of limited liability).
1o8 This is not to suggest that the tort victim is, or should be, without remedy;
in the absence of veil-piercing, he or she will still be able to recover from the
corporate entity itself.
109 Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 103, at 112.
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ostensibly absent in the non-profit corporation (it is a non-
profit, after all), its central purpose is not to centralize contrac-
tual rights and obligations. Therefore, the purpose of confer-
ring entity-hood on such a non-profit corporation is not to
achieve the contractarian goal. However, centralizing contrac-
tual rights and obligations is still critical to the purpose of non-
profit corporations. Rather than viewing the contracting func-
tion as a corollary of profit-seeking behavior, it ought to be
viewed as a corollary of the overarching purpose uniting all
kinds of corporations that first arose in Ancient Rome: pooling
resources to achieve an individually unattainable goal or pur-
pose. 110 This goal can be either production of profit or philan-
thropy (or something else). In other words, Coase's transaction
costs do not disappearjust because the corporation in question
is not for-profit-philanthropic corporations will presumably
want to reduce the transaction costs involved in their non-
profit purpose"' 1 to maximize the resources directly expended
on the corporation's main activities.
The focus on contract in conferring entity-hood on corpora-
tions is distinct from the considerations in conferring per-
sonhood in other contexts. For example, few would deny that
conferring legal personhood on human beings is a pro forma
recognition of the natural rights of humans; doing so gives
human beings the standing to sue in their own right for viola-
tions of their own human rights-rights which are not created
by, but are recognized by, the state-whether by the state,
entities, or other human beings. 1 12 The right to assume con-
tractual rights and obligations is but one piece of this much
broader purpose. Similarly, arguments that natural resources
should be granted legal personhood often focus on the issue of
standing in suing polluters for violating environmental protec-
tion laws, for instance. 113 However, I would suggest, this pur-
pose would not be served by viewing a river or a tree as a nexus
1 10 Hirst, supra note 80.
111 These costs arise from the duplicity necessitated by not having a central
entity to serve as an independent contracting party. See CORPORATE PERSONALITY IN
THE 20TH CENTURY, supra note 78, at 18.
112 See Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, The History of Corporate Personhood, BRENNAN
CTR. FOR JUST. (Apr. 7, 2014), https://www.brennancenter.org/blog/hobby-
lobby-argument [https://perma.cc/9BH6-AX8Y] (noting that the 14th Amend-
ment, adopted after the American Civil War and abolition of slavery, prominently
hinges on the term "person").
113 See James D K Morris & Jacinta Ruru, Giving Voice to Rivers: Legal Person-
ality as a Vehicle for Recognising Indigenous Peoples' Relationships to Water?, 14
AILR 49, 53-55 (2010) (outlining basic arguments in favor of legal personhood for
natural resources).
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of contracts in the same way I and others suggest viewing the
separate corporate entity. 1 1 4 The purpose of conferring legal
personhood (or entity-hood) on human beings, natural re-
sources, and corporations surely differ. The purpose and func-
tions of such personhood, although encompassed by the same
term and concept across the board, are therefore different as
well. The practical reasons for conferring personhood delineate
its context-specific purpose-and this is crucial to understand-
ing that there are different breeds of legal person. Not all legal
persons are created equal. In the case of corporations, the
purpose of conferring entity-hood is to centralize contractual
rights and obligations, thereby reducing transaction costs.
B. Purpose Is a Lens with Which to View Scope: Revisiting
Corporate "Speech"
In this subpart, I argue that the central purpose of corpo-
rate entity-hood-as distinguished from the reasons for, and
purposes of, personhood in other cases-should be used as a
lens through which to view the scope of corporations' rights. I
argue that corporate rights should be only those which further
the contractarian purpose of corporate entity-hood. To illus-
trate the practical implications of these assertions, I examine
one prominent United States Supreme Court case in particu-
lar: Citizens United v. FEC,115 a case often affiliated with the
corporate entity-hood debate. I argue first that the Court mis-
characterized the First Amendment's scope; second, that the
Court wrongly blurred the distinction between the corporate
entity and the natural persons behind it; and, third, that the
utilitarian, contractarian purpose of the corporate entity itself
cuts against corporate speech rights. 116
1. Citizens United v. FEC
In 2010, the United States Supreme Court handed down
its decision in Citizens United v. FEC. 117 At its heart, the issue
in the case was one of campaign finance: did certain restric-
tions imposed on corporate political spending by the Bipartisan
Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA) violate the First Amend-
ment's protection of the freedom of speech? 1 8 In particular,
114 Granting a river personhood is a way to protect it, as some scholars sug-
gest, not turn it into an entity to centralize contract rights appurtenant to a
business or some other organizational function. See id. at 54, 57.
115 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
116 See infra section II.B.2.
117 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
118 Id. at 365.
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these restrictions disallowed corporate entities from funding
"electioneering communications" with their general treasury
funds within thirty days of a primary election and within sixty
days of a general election.11 9 The Court ultimately found the
restrictions to be in violation of the First Amendment's protec-
tions. 120 To begin the discussion, I will first flesh out the
Court's reasoning in the context of the corporate entity-hood
debate and then discuss the flaws in that reasoning.
Rather than discussing whether corporations (both for-
profit and non-profit) enjoyed First Amendment speech protec-
tions as part of their personhood "package," the Court pre-
sumed corporations to be speakers for this purpose. 1 2 1 The
Court considered the issue as a restriction on corporations'
assumed protections as First Amendment speakers and held
that Congress could not restrict speech based on the speaker's
corporate identity. 122 The Supreme Court had ruled on multi-
ple occasions prior to Citizens United that First Amendment
protections extended to corporations and that these protec-
tions include the freedom of speech. 123 These rulings, the
Court noted, are based on the idea that the First Amendment
generally protects the dissemination of ideas, regardless of
whether the particular speaker or disseminator of ideas is a
natural person. 124 This reasoning is premised on the idea that
the First Amendment protects some general concept of "dis-
semination of information and ideas,"'12 5 rather than some in-
dividual right to freely express them.
However, the notion that the First Amendment's protection
of "freedom of speech" applies to a general dialogue rather than
an individual right cannot be correct. First, the First Amend-
ment makes a distinction between the freedom of speech and
the freedom of the press. 12 6 If the freedom of speech protected
such a general concept, protecting the freedom of the press
would be redundant. Second, it is possible to construe many
behaviors-human or non-human-as speech generally (under
119 2 U.S.C. § 441(b) (2007), repealed by Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 365.
120 See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 365.
121 Leo Coleman, The Relevance of Personhood in Citizens United and Hobby
Lobby, POL. & LEGAL ANTHROPOLOGY REV. ONLINE (Oct. 27, 2014), https://polar
journal.org/2014/10/27/the-relevance-of-personhood-in-citizens-united-and-
hobby-lobby/[https://perma.cc/S8G4-69A7].
122 See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 365.
123 Id. at 342.
124 Id.
125 Id. at 343.
126 U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press .... ").
20191 519
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
the Court's broad definition), but what is the First Amend-
ment's protection of free speech actually designed to protect?
Inherently, the rights protected under the First Amendment
must be those of persons-however defined. It is exceedingly
difficult to imagine a non-person-natural or juridical-acting
as a disseminator of ideas within the meaning of the First
Amendment. 127 Third, the rights within the Bill of Rights are
inherently individual because they are what provide the status
of legal personhood (or entity-hood) with its legal force. 128 If
the Bill of Rights' protections were as broad as the Supreme
Court assumes in Citizens United, the status of legal person (or
entity) would be limited in its significance. Really, then, speech
rights under the First Amendment are one of the rights that
can be assigned to legal persons. This is the structure within
which the Bill of Rights operates.
Thus, the fundamental flaw in the Supreme Court's logic in
its line of cases ascribing First Amendment speech rights to
corporations is that it obfuscates the distinction between a
general dialogue of ideas on one hand and individual rights,
which are protected under the First Amendment as part of the
Bill of Rights, on the other. 129 The Court seems to presuppose
the existence of rights for juridical persons under the guise of
protecting a free exchange of ideas. 130 While protecting this
free exchange is a noble goal, how does it suggest that corpora-
tions have protected speech under the First Amendment any
more than it suggests that parrots repeating the political views
127 Ideas and the dissemination thereof, I argue, is an inherently person-
centric concept, particularly as it pertains to natural persons.
128 "Let me add that a bill of rights is what the people are entitled to against
every government on earth .... Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison
(Dec. 20, 1787) (emphasis added) (admonishing Madison for not including a bill of
rights in the Constitution). A bill of rights is exactly that: a collection of rights that
"the people"-in their capacity as legal individuals (or persons)-are entitled to.
The "rights" are meaningless absent some legal recognition of the parties that hold
them (i.e., persons or some other legal entity, such as a state). For instance, a
stone is entitled to no protection under the Bill of Rights by virtue of it not being a
legal person.
129 Congress has promulgated, and the Court has allowed, certain restrictions
on First Amendment speech rights that seem to hinder the goal of fostering free
dialogue but are necessary for the enforcement of other laws. See generally KATH-
LEEN ANN RUANE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 7-5700, FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS:
EXCEPTIONS TO THE FIRST AMENDMENT (2014) (discussing exceptions to First Amend-
ment protections). Framing the goal of the First Amendment in the Court-sug-
gested general and vague terms makes most restrictions on the rights it confers,
or non-application of its protections altogether, difficult to argue in favor of.
130 The Court discusses this general concept in its Citizens United ruling. See
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 343 ("Corporations and other associations, like indi-
viduals, contribute to the 'discussion, debate, and the dissemination of informa-
tion and ideas' that the First Amendment seeks to foster.").
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of their masters are protected as well? After all, a parrot has
about as much agency in what it "says" as does a corpora-
tion. 13 1 If parrots were granted legal personhood, would their
repetitions then be protected by the First Amendment? If this
were to be so, I suggest that the justification would be protect-
ing the master's free speech rights expressed through the bird,
not the bird's unique speech rights. Whatever purpose we
might think of to grant legal personhood to parrots, I suspect,
would not include protection of their speech-and protecting
the speech of the masters through the parrots as separate legal
persons blurs the distinction between the two distinct persons.
The Supreme Court got it wrong in Citizens United because it
failed to recognize that the Bill of Rights operates under the
framework of legal entity-hood and that the array of rights
included within it are broken up and granted to different kinds
of entities according to their purpose (with natural persons
being the most broadly encompassing of these). 132
2. Applying the Nexus for Contracts Theory
The primary means a corporation uses to "speak" is spend-
ing money-under the direction of its human agents. 133 While
it sounds noble that protecting such spending serves to en-
courage an active exchange of ideas, we should be separating
our conceptions of the corporation and its human agents
(rather than confusing human speech with corporate activ-
ity),thinking about the corporation as an entity unto itself,
and-most importantly-why this is so. Cutting to the heart of
the issue, corporations are granted entity-hood with the prag-
matic and limiting goal in mind of serving as a nexus for con-
tracts; 1 3 4 protecting their free speech "rights" falls outside of
131 Corporations can only act through their agents; likewise, parrots can only
repeat what someone says. See, e.g., Andrew P. Donovan, Liability of Corporations
Where Statute Requires Agent's Authority to Be in Writing, 23 ST. JOHN'S L. REV.
101, 102 (1948) ("[Bly their very nature, corporations can act only through the
agency of human beings."); Michael Schindlinger, Why Do Parrots Have the Ability
to Mimic?, ScI. AM. (Dec. 5, 2007), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/
experts-parrots-mimic/ [https://perma.cc/L6S5-SXTD] ("When parrots are kept
as pets, they learn their calls from their adoptive human social partners.").
132 See Ciepley, supra note 9, for a discussion of the idea that there ought to be
different kinds of legal persons with different rights, of which the corporation is
but one kind.
133 See Adam Winkler, Corporate Speech is Not "Free," HUFFINGTON POST (Apr.
5, 2010, 5:12 AM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/adam-winkler/corporate-
speech-is-not-f b 448854.html [https://perma.cc/95AS-MWTD] (arguing that
corporate speech is largely limited to the money it spends, which is subject to the
fiduciary duties the corporation's human agents owe to the entity itself).
134 See supra subpart II.A.
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this practical directive and blurs the distinction between corpo-
rations and their human agents. The distinction is blurred
because of the reality noted above: a corporation cannot spend
money or "speak" except through the actions of the humans
controlling its actions. 135 Protecting corporate speech rights,
then, looks an awful lot like protecting the speech rights of its
human agents 3 6-but this would practically ignore the reality
that a corporation is a separate legal entity from its agents in a
way reminiscent of Jensen and Meckling's original argument
that there is not a separate legal entity in the corporation. 137
As in the case of Jensen and Meckling, such an argument is
really an ideological reaction to corporate regulation generally
and should be mistrusted as a descriptive legal theory of
corporations. 13 8
Instead, courts and policymakers ought to consider the
issue of corporate speech from the perspective of protecting the
rights of the corporate entity itself-independent of its human
agents. In so doing, the nexus of contracts theory, retooled as a
theory of corporate entity-hood, is useful. 139 This is because
the theory provides a more coherent framework for legal entity-
hood 140 than the temptation, absent a clearly delineated pur-
pose, for corporate entity-hood: implicitly passing through the
corporate entity to protect the rights of its stakeholders indi-
rectly. 1 4 1 Not all legal persons (or entities, as the case may be)
135 See supra note 131.
136 This, of course, is a laudable goal on its own-but protecting the speech
"rights" of something entirely separate from its stakeholders risks obfuscating the
purpose, function, and treatment of corporations in the ways I have suggested.
137 Such spending, or "speech," would not be attributed to the corporate entity
but rather to the actions of its stakeholders that make up the original conception
of the nexus of contracts. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 11, at 311 (arguing
against reifying the corporate entity).
138 See Eisenberg, supra note 52, at 822-23 (suggesting normative motiva-
tions behind the nexus theory); see also supra section I.C. 1 (discussing the ideo-
logical components of an argument favoring the original nexus theory). Corporate
regulation is a very broad concept and this Note does not comment on the benefits
and disadvantages of its various specific forms, but merely points out the ideologi-
cal underpinnings of the nexus of contracts theory.
139 See supra subpart II.A for a logical explanation of how the nexus of con-
tracts theory can be refocused to act as a theory of corporate entity-hood in light
of Gindis's suggested reconciliation of legal entity-hood and the nexus theory, as
outlined and advocated for supra section I.C.2.
140 This coherent framework is that of a limiting purpose for corporate entity-
hood: consolidating contracts through a separate entity of limited agency to
achieve the Coasean goal of minimizing the costs of doing business. Such a
limited conception avoids mystification of the concept of corporate entity-hood, as
I describe in this Note.
141 As discussed previously, passing through the corporate entity-or denying
its existence altogether-is arguably an ideological response to corporate regula-
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have speech rights that are protected under the First Amend-
ment, 142 and ascribing these rights need not be an automatic
corollary of granting person or entity status. 143 In the context
of Citizens United and its ancestor cases, 14 4 assigning speech
rights to the corporate entity should mean asking whether it
falls within the nexus of contracts purpose of corporate entity-
hood. I suggest that it does not. This is because the idea of the
corporation as a separate entity fulfills a practical legal need-
the functions outlined in subpart II.A, supra-and such need
does not encompass creating a separate legal entity to serve the
practical purpose of a corporation and granting it protection as
a First Amendment speaker. 145 Simply put, corporations do
not need speech rights to enter into contracts.
Corporations, both for-profit and non-profit, are predomi-
nantly vehicles for consolidating contracts-any other purpose
is secondary, or a corollary, of this overarching goal. 146 This is
the case even in a corporation created for the express purpose
of supporting a particular political viewpoint. The views of
tion and responsibility. See Eisenberg, supra note 52, at 822-23. To treat the
corporation and its stakeholders as separate entities or persons, as the case may
be, is to fulfill anti-regulation contractarians' fear that the fictitious corporate
entity will be "reified" in order to treat its rights and obligations separately from
that of its stakeholders. See Gindis, supra note 8, at 128-43 (detailing the "reifi-
cation illusion" and the original nexus theory's ideological underpinnings).
142 See supra subpart II.A for a brief discussion of different types of legal
persons and the differences that can arise in the rights that they have; in particu-
lar, see the discussion of natural resources and their lack of protected speech
rights, despite their personhood, in some foreign jurisdictions. In theory, the logic
of Citizens United and its predecessor cases could be extended to natural re-
sources to protect their speech rights (as they "speak" through their human
agents), but doing so would be an obfuscation, just as it is for corporations; such
protection really just protects the agents' rights to impose their will upon, and
speak through, a separate entity-when focusing on the separate entity, it gives
that entity something it never had: a voice and mind of its own. See Gindis, supra
note 8, at 141-42.
143 See Ciepley, supra note 9, at 139.
144 See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 784-85 (1978) (striking
down a state-law prohibition on corporate independent expenditures based on the
speakers' corporate identity); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 21-23, 39 n.45 (1976)
(invalidating the limitations on campaign expenditures of the Federal Election
Campaign Act of 1971 that applied to corporations and unions).
145 In the context of media corporations (e.g., Time Warner, Inc. or Twenty-
First Century Fox, Inc.), the question arises whether or not the corporate entities'
speech rights are protected; however, the information and views they disseminate
are surely protected by the freedom of the press, which is separate from the
freedom of speech. See U.S. CONST. amend. I. Furthermore, in thinking about the
question of media corporations in particular, one should consider what is actually
being protected-while a publication or other media is being disseminated by the
corporate entity itself, what is contained therein are the views and work of its
contributors (whose rights to free speech are, of course, protected). See id.
146 See supra subpart II.A.
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such a corporation's individual stakeholders are protected by
the First Amendment, but what about the views "expressed" by
the entity itself? One might argue that the First Amendment
protects such "speech" because the stakeholders have merely
chosen this manner of expressing their viewpoints. However,
the corporation as separate entity is a major snag for this argu-
ment-when making a decision on behalf of a corporation to
"speak," the agent stakeholders (often directors) are not free to
impose their own viewpoints but are instead beholden by their
fiduciary duties to act in the best interest of the corporate
entity. 1 4 7 But, is "speaking" in support of the stakeholders'
viewpoint-the raison d'Otre of this hypothetical corporation-
by definition in the best interests of such a corporation? No,
because the corporation's speech is no longer even speech-it
is a business expenditure by the corporation itself. 148 The cor-
porate entity as a nexus for contracts does not have viewpoints,
and the money it spends is a cost of doing business-the busi-
ness for which the corporation was created to consolidate con-
tractual rights and obligations (and its secondary purposes and
functions as described in subpart II.A, supra), not to create an
independent First Amendment speaker. In other words, the
stakeholders can impute a purpose on the corporation, but
that purpose does not itself become "speech" just because they
say it does. 14 9
But, how can we be sure that the freedom of speech is
outside the scope of the contractarian purpose of corporate
entity-hood? While legal personhood is conferred on humans
to protect natural rights to an extent, including some individ-
ual right of free expression, entity-hood is not conferred on
corporations in legal recognition of some set of natural rights of
corporations. 150 Corporate speech has nothing to do with the
147 See Winkler, supra note 133 (arguing that corporate speech is not "free"
because its agents are beholden to the interests of the entity). This is especially
the case in a public corporation with shareholders of disparate political beliefs.
Id. But in a private corporation, it just amounts to abuse of the corporate form.
See supra section II.B. 1 (discussing the parrot analogy).
148 See supra note 147.
149 See discussion of a suggested contractarian conception of corporate entity-
hood in subpart II.A, supra. The distinction between stakeholder and entity be-
comes much blurrier in cases, such as Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado
Civil Rights Commission, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018), which involve non-corporation
entities and individual small business-owners. Such cases deserve separate anal-
ysis and fall outside the scope of this Note.
150 As discussed in subpart II.A, supra, legal personhood (or entity-hood, as
the case may be) is a legally created status, distinct from natural personhood, that
is created by the state and conferred by it to achieve different goals in different
situations; neglecting to question why the status is conferred in a particular case
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corporation as a contracting, property-owning, suing, debtor-
creditor entity. If anything, such protection condones abuse of
the corporate form. 151 Further, a right to speak does nothing to
reduce transaction costs in the way corporate entity-hood is
designed to do; while individuals might (and certainly do) find it
more cost-effective to pool resources in an entity and influence
campaigns that way, this does not justify the conferral of a
fundamental right on the corporation at the expense of obfus-
cating the limited utilitarian purpose of corporate entity-
hood. 152
Others, such as David Ciepley, have also reached the con-
clusion that speech rights fall outside the scope of corpora-
tions' rights, though while focusing on corporate entities as
"franchise governments," neither public nor private. 153 Ciepley
is right to suggest that corporate entities ought to be treated as
their own category of "person" for purposes of the granting of
rights. 154 What the Gindis-inspired nexus -for-contracts idea
offers is a theoretical underpinning for why that separate cate-
gory should exist at all. It is not merely that corporations are
different-different from other categories of person though they
may be. Ciepley focuses on the corporate entity as a governing
body 5 5 -but the addition of the nexus for contracts framework
allows for even more focus in defining corporate rights by creat-
ing a litmus test ("Is this right necessary for the corporate
entity to function as a nexus for contracts?") for any and all
rights which corporations might seek at some point in the fu-
ture. Nexus for contracts is a forward-looking addition to, and
theoretical justification of, Ciepley's initial core corporate-
rights idea, and one that preserves the Coasean, contractual,
liberal ideal of the corporation. 156
is unhelpful. See generally Dyschkant, supra note 43 (outlining the basic differ-
ences between legal and natural personhood).
151 As I discussed earlier, in the context of private corporations that are closely
held, ascribing shareholder speech rights to the corporation obfuscates the
boundary between two separate legal entities, something doctrines, such as pierc-
ing the corporate veil, seek to avoid. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
152 See id. and accompanying text (outlining some policy justifications for
maintaining a clear divide between legal entities and the natural persons behind
them).
153 See Ciepley, supra note 9, at 140, 155-56 (describing corporations as
franchise governments and suggesting they ought not have speech rights).
154 Id.
155 Id.
156 Ciepley suggests corporations hold three "core" rights as franchise govern-
ments, and his suggestion is a good one that goes a long way toward road-
blocking the slippery slope of corporate "personhood" rights. See id.
20191 525
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
All this is to say that understanding the corporate entity to
be principally a nexus for contracts can justify limiting the
contents of its rights accordingly. This Note does not attempt
to delineate each and every right the corporate entity should
and should not hold to achieve this utilitarian end-such a
question I will leave to future scholarship-but speech rights
protected by the First Amendment, I assert, is not one of them.
This becomes evident through an understanding that the First
Amendment protection of speech protects an individual right of
some types of person-not some general right or an even more
general conception of free dialogue (although this is undoubt-
edly a policy justification for the individual rights the First
Amendment does protect)-in addition to a more coherent and
limited understanding of the purpose of corporate entity-hood.
CONCLUSION
So, corporations are "people,"'157 but this Note ends where
it began: what does that mean? As this Note argues, the an-
swer lies in an unexpected place. The nexus of contracts the-
ory is customarily understood to cut against the corporation as
a separate legal entity-it is nothing more than a web of agree-
ments between its stakeholders. This need not be so. As David
Gindis has suggested, the entity-hood of the corporation is cru-
cial to the contractarian role of this business form: the entity
serves as a separate juridical "person" through which contrac-
tual rights and obligations can be centralized. 158 The nexus of
contracts does not take the place of the entity, it is the entity.
The understanding of the corporate entity as a nexus for
contracts captures both Ancient Roman and Coasean aspects
of corporate purpose-pooling capital and mitigating transac-
tion costs. The corporate nexus offers asset partitioning and
limited liability, among other features, that serve the con-
tractarian goal. It is simply more efficient to have a corporate
entity contracting and dealing, rather than each of its stake-
holders contracting and dealing severally. This understanding
provides a much-needed framework for corporate entity-
hood-one which ought to define the scope of corporations'
rights. This framework is one that helps to justify and further
refine David Ciepley's and others' suggestion that corporate
entities ought to be their own category of legal "person" and, as
such, have their rights separately determined. The nexus of
157 Though I refrained from using the "person" characterization in Part II, this
reference serves the rhetorical purpose of attempting to demystify that concept.
158 See Gindis, supra note 8, at 125.
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contracts theory, reconciled with corporate entity-hood, is a
lens through which to examine the content of corporate
rights-if a right is not within the scope of the utilitarian, con-
tractarian purpose of corporate entity-hood, it should not be
granted. Corporate speech falls outside of that limited scope.
The nexus for contracts framework outlined in this Note builds
on previous work-from Coase to Jensen and Meckling to
Gindis to Ciepley-in taking the next step toward crafting a
logically consistent, practical, and-above all else-coherent
theory of corporate entity-hood.
